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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Nancy Michelle Hartsock appeals from the judgment entered upon her 
guilty plea to drawing a check without funds.  Hartsock argues the district court 
abused its discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.    
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Hartsock with burglary, drawing a check without funds, 
and petit theft.  (R., pp. 19-20.)  Hartsock agreed to waive her preliminary 
hearing and plead guilty to the drawing a check without funds charge pursuant to 
an Alford1 plea, and the state agreed to dismiss the burglary and petit theft 
charges.  (R., pp. 40, 42-52.)  The state also agreed to recommend a suspended 
sentence of one year fixed plus two years indeterminate, and to recommend no 
more than 90 days in local jail.  (R., p. 47.)  Hartsock was free to argue for a 
different sentence.  (Id.)  Hartsock filled out and signed both an 
Acknowledgement of Alford Plea and a Guilty Plea Advisory and Form.  (R., pp. 
42-52; 1/28/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 7 – p. 9, L. 12.)  The court questioned Hartsock and 
her attorney regarding the guilty plea and found it was made knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently.  (R., pp. 55-56.)    
THE COURT:  At the end of the Guilty Plea Advisory Form, you’ve 
also signed it looks like on the 23rd of this month and your attorney 
has signed below you on today’s date January the 28th.  And did 
you sign with the intent of presenting this document to me as one 
whole document that you wish the court to consider? 
 
A.  Yes, Your Honor. 
                                            
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) 
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THE COURT:  Okay, Ms. Jensen, are you convinced that your 
client understands her rights, as well as the significance of waiving 
those rights and entering a guilty plea? 
 
MS. JENSEN:  I do, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  To the charge that I’ve arraigned you on which is 
drawing a check on a closed account or an account with no funds 
in it, in violation of Idaho Code 18-3106(a), which is a felony, are 
you now pleading guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine? 
 
A.  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  Has anyone made any threats or promises to you to 
get you to plead guilty, other than those that are specifically set 
forth in the written plea agreement that we’ve been talking about? 
 
A.  No, sir. 
 
THE COURT:  You understand that by pleading guilty, you’re 
waiving a number of important rights, perhaps most importantly is 
your right to require the State to prove your guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt at a jury trial. 
 
A.  Yes, Your Honor.  
 
THE COURT:  All right then.  I do accept your plea as knowing, 
voluntary and intelligent. …  
 
(1/28/15 Tr., p. 9, L. 6 – p. 10, L. 11.)  The court then scheduled a sentencing 
hearing for March 20, 2015.  (1/28/15 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 10-14.)  The day before the 
sentencing hearing, the parties stipulated to continue the sentencing because 
Hartsock was “working on resolving other legal matters in Montana” and the 
district court reset the hearing for April 21, 2015.  (R., pp. 66-68.)   
On April 20, 2015, the day before the continued hearing, Hartsock moved 
to continue her sentencing hearing again because she did “not have 
transportation to make it to court.”  (R., pp. 69-70.)  The court set her sentencing 
for May 5, 2015.  (R., pp. 71.)   
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On May 4, 2015, the day before her new sentencing hearing, Hartsock 
moved to withdraw her guilty plea.  (R., pp. 72-73.)  The district court held a 
hearing on Hartsock’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea.  (R., pp. 74-75.)  
Hartsock argued that she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea because 
“she is not guilty and regrets making the entry of guilty plea pursuant to Alford at 
the time of her preliminary hearing.”  (5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 5-12.)   
The district court determined that Hartsock failed to provide a sufficient 
basis to withdraw her guilty plea.  (5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 13-20.)  The district court 
also found that the state would be prejudiced if Hartsock were permitted to 
withdraw her guilty plea because the state dismissed charges as part of the plea 
agreement and the state would not be able to re-file.  (5/5/15 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 5-
24.)  The district court denied Hartsock’s motion.  (R., pp. 74-75, 82.)   
The district court sentenced Hartsock to one year fixed and two years 
indeterminate, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 76-80.)  The district court 
recommended that Hartsock be placed in the Corrective Alternative Placement 
(CAPP) rider program.  (R., p. 77.)  The district court entered judgment.  (R., pp. 
76-80.)   
Hartsock moved for reconsideration of her sentence under Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35.  (R., pp. 83-87.)  After a hearing, the district court denied the Rule 35 
motion.  (R., pp. 88-89, 98-101.)  The district court held, in part, that “Hartsock is 
in desperate need of treatment, and that participation in CAPP offers her the 
best opportunity for rehabilitation.”  (R., p. 100.)  Hartsock timely appealed.  (R., 
pp. 93-95.)  
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ISSUE 
Hartsock states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Ms. Hartsock’s 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea?  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Hartsock failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea?   
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ARGUMENT 
 
Hartsock Has Failed To Demonstrate The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying Hartsock’s Motion To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea 
 
A. Introduction 
 Hartsock pled guilty pursuant to an Alford plea.  (R., pp. 55-56.)  After 
Hartsock examined the recommendation contained within the PSI, Hartsock 
moved to withdraw her guilty plea.  (R., pp. 72-73.)  Hartsock argued that she 
should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea because she regretted her guilty 
plea and she thought she was not guilty.  (5/15/15 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 5-12.)  The 
district court rejected her argument and found she failed to present a just cause 
to withdraw her guilty plea.  (R., p. 82; 5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, L. 13 p. 17, L. 24.)   
 On appeal, Hartsock repeats the argument made by her trial counsel.  
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.)  Hartsock has failed to show the district court 
abused its discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
It is within the discretion of the trial court whether to grant or deny a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea.  State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535, 211 
P.3d 775, 780 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 
801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)).  The district court’s discretion should be 
liberally exercised.  See State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 
284 (1990).  “Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is 
limited to whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as 
distinguished from arbitrary action.”  Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535-536, 211 P.3d 
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at 780-781 (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 
(Ct. App. 1997)).   
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion When It Denied 
Hartsock’s Motion To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea 
 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made before sentence is 
imposed.  I.C.R. 33(c).  The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an 
automatic right, however.  Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 298, 787 P.2d at 284; 
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780.  The defendant bears the burden 
of proving, in the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn.  Hanslovan, 
147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780; Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 374-375, 825 
P.2d 94, 97-98 (Ct. App. 1992).  In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, 
the district court must determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea was 
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.  Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 
211 P.3d at 781; Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959, 801 P.2d at 1310.  As a matter of 
constitutional due process, a plea is knowing and voluntary if it is “entered by 
one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any 
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel.”  Brady 
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).   
If the plea was voluntary, in the constitutional sense, then the court must 
determine whether other just cause exists to allow the defendant to withdraw the 
plea.  Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781.  The good faith, credibility, 
and weight of the defendant’s assertions in support of her motion to withdraw her 
plea are matters for the trial court to decide.  Id. at 537, 211 P.3d at 782.  When 
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the motion is presented after the defendant has learned of the content of the PSI 
or has received other information about the probable sentence, the district court 
may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant’s apparent motive.  State v. 
Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004).   
Here, Hartsock made her motion to withdraw her guilty plea after she 
learned of the contents of the PSI.  (5/5/15 Tr., p. 15, L. 1 – p. 17, L. 4.)  In 
denying Hartsock’s motion, the district court noted that Hartsock’s plea was 
made pursuant to Alford and that there was “a written plea in the file and a 
written Alford plea; fairly exhaustive plea.”  (5/5/15 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 17-23.)  The 
court also noted that Hartsock and the court went over the plea “extensively” at 
the time Hartsock entered it, and Hartsock did not present any valid basis to 
withdraw the guilty plea.  (5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, L. 24 – p. 17, L. 4.)  The court was 
“concerned that [Hartsock] received the Presentence Report and [was not] very 
happy with the recommendation because the Presentence did recommend 
retain[ed] jurisdiction,” as opposed to probation and local jail time, as 
contemplated by the plea agreement.  (5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 17-24; compare PSI, 
pp. 16, 20 (classifying Hartsock as high risk to reoffend and recommendation 
retained jurisdiction) with R., p. 47 (prosecutor bound by plea agreement to 
recommend suspend sentence and no more than 90 days local jail).)  The district 
court held that Hartsock’s regrets at making the plea and her claims of innocence 
did not constitute a basis to withdraw the guilty plea, especially since the motion 
was made after Hartsock learned of the contents and recommendations of the 
PSI.  (5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, L. 8 – p. 17, L. 4.)  As the district court stated, “But not 
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liking the recommendation … the presentence investigator made is not a valid 
reason to withdraw your plea.”  (5/5/15 Tr., p. 16, L. 24 – p. 17, L. 1.)   
The district court also found that the state would be prejudiced if Hartsock 
were permitted to withdraw the guilty plea because as a result of the plea deal, 
Hartsock was released from custody and the state dismissed a misdemeanor 
and a felony charge and the state “wouldn’t be able to re-file that charge.”  
(5/5/15 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 13-24.)   
On appeal, Hartsock repeats the arguments of her trial counsel.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.)  Hartsock reiterates the argument that her regret 
regarding her guilty plea and claimed innocence constitute a “just reason” to 
withdraw her guilty plea.  (Id).  Hartsock also argues that the district court erred 
in finding prejudice to the state because the “State has not shown prejudice 
because there is no reason to believe that the State would be unable to refile the 
previously dismissed charges.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  Even if the state does 
not show prejudice, Hartsock was still required to present and support a 
plausible reason to withdraw her guilty plea.  See Mayer, 139 Idaho at 647, 84 
P.3d at 583 (“A defendant’s failure to present and support a plausible reason will 
dictate against granting withdrawal, even absent prejudice to the prosecution.” 
(citation omitted)).     
On appeal, Hartsock has failed to show the district court abused its 
discretion.  “When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the 
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 
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lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with 
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether 
the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  Hanslovan, 147 
Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780 (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).   
The district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion.  
(5/5/15 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 13-16) (“The decision whether to grant or deny a motion – 
that motion would be within the discretion of the district and it would be governed 
by Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c).”).  The district court acted within the boundaries of 
such discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards.  The court 
denied the motion, which was within the boundaries of the discretion and the 
district court acted consistently with the applicable legal standards, namely Idaho 
Criminal Rule 33(c).  (See 5/5/15 Tr., p. 14, L. 9 – p. 17, L. 4.)  The district court 
recognized that Hartsock was required to show a “just reason” to withdraw the 
guilty plea.  (See Id.)  The district court also correctly concluded that Hartsock’s 
mere protestation of innocence, after reviewing the PSI, was not a just reason to 
withdraw her plea.  See, e.g., State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 162-163, 75 P.3d 
214, 216-217 (Ct. App. 2003) (“A declaration of innocence does not entitle a 
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. … If mere assertion of legal innocence were 
always a sufficient condition for withdrawal, withdrawal would effectively be an 
automatic right.”).  Finally, the district court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason.  The district court examined the file and the extensive and exhaustive 
plea, and the district court examined the argument proffered by Hartsock. (See 
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5/5/15 Tr., p. 14, L. 9 – p. 17, L. 4.)  Hartsock failed to provide the district court 
just cause to justify withdrawing her valid guilty plea.  On appeal, Hartsock has 
repeated the rejected argument made by trial counsel and has failed to show the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her 
guilty plea.   
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court.   
 DATED this 15th day of April, 2016. 
 
       
 _Ted S. Tollefson______ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
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